Eisenhower's H-Bomb "White Paper": A Pompous and Hollow Fraud, See Pages 2 and 3.

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Why The Workers Rise Against The Workers' State

For those of us who have all our lives regarded socialism as our ideal, it is humbling to see that the leading role in the convulsions sweeping Eastern Europe is being taken by the working class, and by the factory workers in particular. Those to whom socialism in the Nineteenth century most appealed, the workers, the idealist students, the intellectuals with a conscience, these are the elements at the head of the risings in Poland and Hungary today, as they may be tomorrow in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. It is not the ghost of the dispossessed bourgeoisie nor the resistance of the incorrigible peasant to whatever threatens his hold on the land; it is the reaction against Marxism-Leninism by those very elements it sought to serve and to inspire. These risings in the middle of the Twentieth Century are a caricature of what happened in 1870, in 1905 and in 1917. The workers rise against the workers' state. The epic of the Paris Commune and the Moscow Soviet is played out again in reverse.

Emancipators Can Become Oppressors

It is instructive to notice that workers may be aroused to the same kind of fury against their socialist managers as against any capitalist oppressor. This will not surprise those of us who have been in Eastern Europe and caught that aroma of ruling class complacency which rose from the party apparatus whether in Stalinist Russia or Titoist Yugoslavia. The men who devoted their lives to the emancipation of the oppressed are too often and too soon succeeded by men who now take it for granted that *they* shall have the Cadillacs, the *dachas,* the more spacious apartments, the fine linen and the servants. Sometimes it is even the same men. This would not have surprised the great anarchists of the last century; from Bakunin to Kropotkin, they foresaw that a socialist bureaucracy could also oppress and exploit. There was an echo of their warnings in a contemptuous reference which Gomulka made in his speech to the Polish Central Committee on October 20. He spoke of those in the leadership of the Communist Party who "felt more strongly linked with their comfortable posts than with the working class." It is the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat with secret police and censor at his disposal to protect that comfortable post, who is the universal focus of the long pent up anger among the masses in the Soviet world. More fundamental than the economic problem is the moral and institutional problem implicit in this picture; men will suffer want together in the pursuit or defense of an ideal. It is an unjust inequality of sacrifice, a high-handedness among those who claim to serve them, that embitters and provokes. No condescending stereotypes about "bourgeois democracy" can hide the giant lesson of events—the worker needs the secret ballot, the opposition party, "due process" of law and the free press fully as much under socialism as under capitalism. Otherwise he has merely changed bosses.

"Liberationism" Revised

How Dulles Welcomed Gomulka

Mr. NOVINS: Well, Mr. Secretary, you have been talking about liberty and liberation . . . but this isn't the situation currently [in Poland] is it? It's a case of changing one kind of Communist leaders for another kind. . . .

Secretary DULLES: . . . The important thing from the standpoint of the United States is to see a breakup of this great so-called monolithic structure . . . of the Soviet Communistic world, because that is a great danger to the United States.

Now, there is another problem, that is, what is the internal government of States? A great many countries have an internal government that we don't like . . . but we do not believe that democracy is something that ought to be imposed, or that, whether or not a nation is democratic, in our sense of the word, ought to determine whether or not we are going to have friendly relations with that country.

Mr. NOVINS: But if a nation—

Secretary DULLES: If we had that test, we would have friendly relations with very few countries.

—CBS "Face The Nation," Oct. 21.

How Hard The Worker Was Driven

The new bosses, sure of their jobs, secure from criticism, fearful only of purge from above, may mess up an economy and hide their own incompetence from view. Gomulka in that same speech acidly analyzed the reality behind the boast that in 1955 at the end of the Polish Six Year Plan the output of coal—the key item of the Polish economy—was 20 million tons higher than in 1949 at the end of the Three Year Plan. This is the sort of figure that is customarily trumpeted abroad as evidence of success. But Gomulka showed that more than 14 million tons of this increase was due to overtime work, that output per worker per working day in coal mining had dropped 12.4 percent in 1955 as compared with 1949, and 36 percent as compared with 1938. "The economic policy in relation to the mining industry," Gomulka said, "was marked by unpardonable thoughtlessness. The system of work on Sundays was introduced, and this could not but ruin the health and strength of the miners, and at the same time made it difficult to maintain colliery installations in proper working order. The practice was also introduced of employing soldiers and prisoners in some of the collieries. . . ." This glimpse of the actual conditions in Poland's most important industry tells us more than any abstractions of why it became politically necessary to put

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White House Statement on H-Bomb Tests Begins With A Falsification . . .

I

All day long last Tuesday the telephones in the press room at the White House kept ringing. All day the answer was the same. No hour had been set for the release of the White Paper Eisenhower had promised on the question of H-bomb tests. It was not until after 6 p.m. that the paper was finally given out, for immediate release, presumably too late for Adlai to get a quick fill-in by telephone and revise the speech he was preparing to give that evening in New York City.

The document started impressively, in that high pompous style thought by Eisenhower's ghost writers to be called for when he discusses nuclear arcana: "I have concluded it to be in the public interest" (this sounded more like Il Duce than Ike) "to place before you—the American people—and before the world—a full and explicit review. . . ." But what reporters got were 18 mimeographed pages hastily stapled together, of which nine were merely a chronological digest of disarmament negotiations since 1945 such as could be compiled (with two exceptions) from the World Almanac or any other handy desk reference work. With this was a four page statement from the President and a five page document headed, "Memorandum—Weapons Tests and Peaceful Uses of the Atom," the kind of outline one prepares for a busy executive who does not wish to be bothered with too many details. The only new revelation came in the chronology which showed that in June 1954 and again in June 1955 the question of suspending H-bomb tests was discussed at Cabinet level and rejected.

Only Limitation Promised

The Eisenhower statement began with a major falsification. To say that the government "has repeatedly stated its readiness, indeed its anxiety, to put all nuclear weapons permanently aside—to stop all tests of such weapons . . ." is not true. American military policy is today based squarely on the use of nuclear weapons. The chronology states the case correctly when it summarizes our latest disarmament offer as made by Stassen on April 23 to the UN subcommittee in London. We are "prepared to agree to *restrictions* on the testing of nuclear weapons provided there has been agreement on an effective *limitation* of nuclear weapons under proper safeguards . . . and provided this agreement *limiting* nuclear weapons has been satisfactorily carried out." (Italics added.) The Eisenhower Administration has never gone beyond an offer to *limit* tests and *limit* nuclear weapons.

II

It is because the military are trying to commit us irrevocably to nuclear war that so much stress is being placed on the need for testing in order to develop "humane" bombs. "The most recent tests," the President said, "enable us to harness and discipline our weapons more precisely and effectively—drastically reducing their fallout and making them more easy to concentrate, if ever used, upon military objectives." This amount of fallout *can* be reduced by reducing the ratio of fissionable uranium in the fission-fusion-fission bomb; and smaller bombs are not as terrible as bigger bombs. But it is a delusion to believe that if war comes, the bigger and more terrible bombs would not ultimately be used. Lord Montgomery, deputy chief of NATO, said recently "If anyone in the world starts aggression we shall give them the works from the word go, with Atom and Hydrogen bombs, and the biggest things we've got . . . I wouldn't mind the consequences."

This effort to improve the public relations of the H-bomb was dealt with at Atlanta on October 10 in a speech made to the annual conference of the U.S. Civil Defense Council by Congressman Chet Holifield of California. As a long time member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and chairman of the House subcommittee which held extensive hearings on civil defense this year, Holifield can speak with authority. "The representations by Admiral Strauss," Holifield said, in a speech which has been given little newspaper attention, "to the effect that the fallout hazard can be minimized and nuclear war made more humanitarian, overlooks one important factor. . . . The cold, hard, brute facts of planning in a nuclear age argue in favor of the 'dirty' weapon because it gives far more 'bang for a buck'. . . . Those who are responsible for civil defense planning in this country would be unrealistic if they assumed other than that the worst kind of weapon would be used and that the worst possible fallout conditions would follow a nuclear attack on this country."

Rugged Individualism in The Nuclear Age

Every Man for Himself If the H-Bomb Falls

"Survival in such an unhappy eventuality [of an H-bomb attack] would depend largely on what prior precautions had been taken by individuals and families for their own safety, in line with the recommendations of the civil defense authorities. . . . The Government, regardless of the extent of its planning or of how many billions of dollars it might spend on civil defense, cannot assume responsibility for the safety of its individual citizens after the bombs or missiles have started falling. At that point, survival will depend largely on how well we have learned the lessons of civil defense, as individuals and families—to what extent we have prepared home shelters, stocked emergency supplies and acquainted ourselves with decontamination procedures. It will depend also on how well we understand the problems of the lingering dangers of fallout. If a nuclear attack should be made upon us, the decision of life or death—for the individual—may have long since been made by him, in indifference or in healthy solicitude."

—AEC Chairman Strauss to the Joint U.S.-Canada Civil Defense Committee, Battle Creek, Mich, Oct. 19

Ours not to question why when the secret decisions are made that may precipitate nuclear war, but once the bombs fall—we're on our own.

A great Indian statesman, C. Rajagopalachari, the last Governor General of India, writing in *Peace News* (London) Sept. 28 put this whole campaign into perspective when he said, "Military activities in research on both sides at present appear to be assiduously engaged in the designing of relatively milder nuclear weapons. . . . The hope is that a nuclear war can be designed which will not mean the wiping out of civilization. . . . But the hard truth is that war in the atomic age cannot be limited. . . . At the moment when the crisis of defeat is reached and surrender must be faced, no considerations will have weight enough to deter the use of the thermonuclear H-bomb. . . ." The notion that H-bomb warfare can somehow be made humane is a menace to the future of mankind.

III

Coupled with this notion is the new argument for H-bomb tests put forward by AEC Chairman Strauss and echoed in the White House statement. This is that the tests are needed because, as Eisenhower said, they develop "knowledge vital to our whole program of civil defense." This argument was unveiled and developed by Admiral Strauss the week before in the speech he made to the Joint U. S. Canada Civil Defense Committee at Battle Creek, Michigan, on October 19. "In order to provide our people with the guidance and instruction which may later save their lives," Strauss declared, "the civil defense authorities need constant access to new and up-to-

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. . . And Inadvertently Discloses A Lost Opportunity to Win The Initiative

date information about the effects of nuclear weapons of all types and sizes. . . . The only source of this data so necessary to civil defense planning," he continued, "is the actual testing of nuclear weapons. . . . The survival of our own people and the civilian populations of the entire free world depends . . . on information which is derived from our own carefully controlled nuclear tests."

This is without a doubt the largest explosion of thermonuclear hot air yet to be staged by the Atomic Energy Commission. The answer is threefold. 1. We have no real civil defense to speak of. 2. Secrecy and red tape keep its officials from knowing what the AEC is doing. 3. It makes little difference to civilians whether they are hit by a ten kiloton or a ten megaton bomb; they won't know the difference.

A Phantom Program

The best picture of civil defense realities comes from the chairman of the Congressional subcommittee which has just finished investigating it. In that speech at Atlanta, Georgia, Congressman Holifield told the fifth annual conference of the U. S. Civil Defense Council, "We have in this nation today a kind of 'make believe' civil defense, directed by well meaning bureaucrats in Washington who scurry around with an important air but who don't quite know what they are about. . . . There is nothing facetious," he went on, "in my remarks about this 'phantom' civil defense program. . . . No one has yet invented any magic formula for moving millions of people from congested metropolitan areas in a few minutes, or even in a few hours. . . . No one has yet devised any means for sheltering people from lethal fallout radiation along exit routes."

Last July 27 the Holifield Committee (the Military Affairs subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee) released a report, "Civil Defense for National Survival." This provides some glimpses which show one how hollow is the Strauss picture of AEC and civil defense working hand in hand to use bomb tests for the protection of civilian populations. "While the AEC insists," the report says at page 12, "that its information is available for civil defense purposes, the subcommittee notes that publications dating back 7 or 8 years on biological and medical effects of radiation only now are being released." Again, on page 51, the report says, "The FCDA [Federal Civil Defense Administration] is not in a position to utilize fully and properly the enormous resources of the military agencies and the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] partly because of its lack of scientific and technical personnel and partly because of security requirements." Those who know say this is understatement.

It wouldn't make much difference anyway. Let us turn again to the report. At page 80-81 are words which somebody ought to put into every newspaper in America so people could realize the full gravity of what is involved in this controversy. "A close reading of [Civil Defense] Administrator Peterson's testimony," the report says, "strongly suggests that he entertains great doubt about the value of civil defense planning in the face of the high yield nuclear weapon threat. He came out early in his prepared statement with this dramatic description of his occupation: 'I have been staring into hell for three years. . . .' He envisaged a bleak wasteland, with tens of millions of dead and injured, the desolate survivors living in the most wretched way, eating gruel, covered with rags, sleeping anywhere they can. He insisted to the committee that he would not be a party to any pretense that America can 'delegate, and by planning, and by thinking' ready itself for this holocaust by normal peacetime methods." Finally, and this applies to Strauss and the whole Eisenhower Administration, Peterson "stated his contempt for anybody who attempts to minimize the sheer destructiveness and death and desolation that will befall mankind if these weapons are dropped."

Sample Warnings Ike Ignores

"The [National Academy of Sciences] report states that, except for accidents, the biological damage from peacetime activities, which include the testing of atomic weapons, has been 'essentially negligible.' For a fuller statement . . . the entire report of the National Academy of Sciences should be examined."

—Memorandum released by the White House, Oct. 24.

"At present, the amount of SR 90 in the stratosphere from nuclear weapon tests is far too small to approach maximum permissible concentration even if it were all to be deposited now. However, if the testing programs of the several countries producing thermonuclear weapons were to intensify, stratospheric storage time may become a critical item in terms of hazard to mankind."

—Page 60, Summary Reports, National Academy of Sciences.

"The fall-out from weapons testing has, so far, led to considerably less irradiation of the population than have the medical uses—and has therefore been less detrimental. So long as the present level is not increased this will continue to be true; but there remains a proper concern to see to it that the fall-out does not increase to more serious levels. . . . We ought to keep all of our expenditures of radiation as low as possible. . . . From the point of view of genetics they are all bad."

—p. 30, Same.

"First, since any additional radiation is genetically undesirable the fall-out dose is genetically undesirable."

—p. 27, Same.

"It appears, then, that strontium 90 is not a current threat, but if there were any substantial increase in the rate of contamination of the atmosphere, it could become one."

—p. 21, Report to the Public, National Academy.

IV

Against this background, the treatment of the Bulganin letter by the White House for a supposed political advantage in the final wrassle of the campaign was cheap press agentry. It is a measure of our national sickness that debate suddenly switched to who Bulganin was for—Eisenhower or Stevenson. Everybody in this country strives to follow Communist party line counter clockwise; the compass of our destiny swings in reaction to Moscow; the lodestar of our policy is not our national interest but a panicky determination never to be caught agreeing with the Russians.

But the proposal to end H-bomb tests began in the British House of Commons after the Bikini fallout in March 1954. The first figure of world prominence to take it up was Nehru, on March 29 of that year. Moscow was at first as opposed as we. When Hearst interviewed Bulganin in Moscow on February 12 of last year, Bulganin dismissed a ban on tests as unimportant. "If we limited or discontinued altogether the experiments in that field," Bulganin told Hearst, "what would that give to the people? In fact nothing because both sides would retain"—their bombs. It was not until November 28 of last year, *two days after Russia tested what it claimed was the biggest H-bomb ever*, that Moscow declared itself ready to negotiate an end of tests. Apparently the Russians were unwilling to stop testing until they had tested their own new bomb.

If Eisenhower in June, 1954, had decided to call for a world halt of tests, he could have had the moral initiative then—and perhaps blocked a test of the new Russian weapon.

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This Is The 1848 of the Soviet World

(*Continued from Page One*)

a man like Gomulka at the head of the Polish regime, indeed it explains why the regime and the Russians needed Gomulka so badly that he could bargain and insist on his own terms.

When I was in Warsaw last spring, the same people who boasted that they had resisted Russian demands for a "show trial" of Gomulka and saved his life were as insistent that Gomulka would never come back in the party or the government. Obviously they, like the Russians, underestimated the strength of the tide set in motion by the Twentieth Congress in the Soviet Union and overestimated the power of the party apparatus to keep the popular upsurge of hope within the safe bounds of comfortably vague fulminations against "the cult of the individual." I felt then that Poland, because of its spirit and traditions, would (rather than Yugoslavia) take the lead in the Soviet world toward more concrete changes. It is clear now that economic disintegration and popular discontent had been growing to the point where a Gomulka in Poland and a Nagy in Hungary had become urgent necessities. They were necessary as symbols of some real change. No one, perhaps not even Gomulka or Nagy, really know what they stand for in terms of a program; both are perhaps too old in Communist party ways really to understand the cry for freedom. But their political power in this juncture arises from the need of the masses to see at the head of the government someone whose sincerity has been certified by persecution, whose spirit has been purged by suffering. Above all in Warsaw as in Budapest the masses wanted someone who had suffered at the hands of the Russians and their stooges and could therefore be trusted to express wounded national sensibilities against the occupying Power and the Russian-style Communist bureaucrat.

The Holy Alliance of Communism

This is the 1848 of Communism. In 1848, the February revolution in Paris set off a chain reaction across Europe against that hated combination of secret policeman and priest which was symbolized in the Holy Alliance and Metternich. Within a few months half the thrones in Europe had been overturned and constitutions exacted from the remainder by a revolutionary bourgeoisie sick of the decayed alliance of feudalism and clericalism. A century later we see a similar rising, this time by the working class in Eastern Europe against a similarly ubiquitous secret police enforcing a new sacred dogma and maintaining a new lay priesthood in power under communism. Poznan and Poland have ignited a new revolt under far more difficult circumstances, though remarkably alike in surface detail. Thus in the boasted age of atomic bomb and jet plane, the urban mob, the student rally, even the barricade make their reappearance and exert their power. Tito, who led the first revolt against Stalinism, now holds back; it is his own heretic, Dedijer, who hails the Polish revolutionaries. The Yugoslav and Russian bureaucrats discover a mutual interest in putting the brakes on this revolt against bureaucracy, and in Budapest for the first time the demonstrators demand an end of the one-party system—an historic moment. For without a legal opposition, there can be no real reform of communism, no real democratization.

The Danger To and From Moscow

Danger besets this new revolution on every hand. There is the danger of sliding back into an East European morass of black clerical reaction supported by the West, as Horthy and Pilsudski once were. There is the danger that Russia, fearing the loss of its new *cordon sanitaire* in Eastern Europe, may intervene more openly, precipitating international consequences. There is the danger that the Russian rulers, unsure of themselves, divided in their counsels, may turn back from their hesitant dip into liberalization and restore Stalinist harshness, fearing that the revolutionary ferment may even reach and arouse the long submissive and terrorized workers and intellectuals of the Soviet Union. Polish revolt has often sparked Russian uprising. In Moscow alone there is no Tito, no Gomulka, no Nagy, to symbolize a real break with the past; there alone Stalin's collaborators survive in power. What if Trotzky had never been exiled and murdered, what if Bukharin had never been liquidated! What a different picture there might be in Moscow today! How differently Russia could deal with its rebellious satellites and protect its legitimate interests if they saw in Moscow new faces they could trust!

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